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THE CRACK IN JUSTICE SCALIA'S CRYSTAL BALL:
SINGLE-SEX CHARTER SCHOOLS MAY PROVE HIS
PREDICTION IN VMI WAS WRONG
In his dissent in United States v. Virginia,1 Justice Antonin Scalia
lamented that the majority's opinion would assure that no one would
experiment with opening single-sex schools, stating, "it ensures that
single-sex public education is functionally dead."2 Justice Scalia was,
at least for the present time, wrong. On August 22, 2000, the Young
Women's Leadership Charter School opened, becoming the only all-
girls public school in Chicago and the fourth nationally.3 The school
was modeled after a New York single-sex public school, the Young
Women's Leadership School of East Harlem, which opened in 1996
and has been praised for its success in improving its female students'
test scores.4
Both charter schools and single-sex public education have been
touted by proponents as critical to school reforms, and, at the same
time, disparaged by critics on a number of grounds.5 A concern of the
critics of single-sex schools is that they are discriminatory in their
establishment and operations.' The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and National Organization for Women (NOW) filed a
complaint with the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) against the East Harlem school, alleging it violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.7 In 1997, the U.S.
1. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
2. Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote:
Any person with standing to challenge any sex-based classification can haul the
State into federal court and compel it to establish by evidence (presumably in
the form of expert testimony) that there is an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for the classification.... No state official in his right mind will buy
such a high-cost, high-risk lawsuit by commencing a single-sex program. The
enemies of single-sex education have won....
Id. at 597.
3. See Lauren Cowen, A Class of Their Own; A Girls Charter School Leaves Boys out of
the Equation, CHI. TRI., Oct. 1, 2000, at C12. The other three schools are not charter schools.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 451, 453-54 (1999). Levit's article
contains an outstanding overview of major research in single-sex education over the last three
decades, covering studies that conclude single-sex education results in measurable differences
in performance and attitudes of children, and that determine single-sex education is an
insignificant or detrimental factor to performance and attitudes of children.
6. See Cowen, supra note 3.
7. See V. Dion Haynes, Boys and Girls in a Class Apart; Amid Evidence that Males and
Females Learn Differently, More Educators are Embracing the Idea of Separate but Equal,
CHIC. TRm., Sept. 30, 1999, at N1. The Equal Protection Clause states that no State shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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Department of Education "issued an informal preliminary finding
that the school appeared to violate federal law. Two remedies were
suggested: sexually integrate the school or establish a separate but
equal school for boys."' The New York City school chancellor said
he would exercise neither remedy.9
A Michigan school district considered abandoning a single-sex
education option for sixth-grade students after NOW filed a complaint
with the Department of Education, arguing that the single-sex classes
violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972.1"
The Chicago chapter of the ACLU has not challenged the Young
Women's Leadership Charter School, but has indicated concern that
gender should not limit students in Chicago public schools." The
organizers of the Young Women's Leadership Charter School created
differences from previous gender-based admissions policies to help
avoid legal challenges, such as not specifically excluding boys in its
admissions policy and screening children only for age, academic
standing, and city residency. 2 School officials indicated that
8. Wendy Kaminer, The Trouble with Single-Sex Schools, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
1998, at 22, available at http://www.theatlantic.comfissues/98apr/singsex.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 2000).
9. See id.
10. See Sara Gay Dammann, Despite Success, Michigan School Told to End Same-Sex
Classes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 1999, at N17. Title IX states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,
except that: (1) Classes of educational institutions subject to prohibition. in
regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply only to
institutions ofvocational education, professional education, and graduate higher
education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education....
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). This Note will not discuss Title IX applications to single-sex schools
in depth. The U.S. Department of Education discusses the exemption of 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(1)
in a pamphlet about charter schools and civil rights laws:
An exemption in Title IX permits Liocall Elducation A[uthoritiels to establish
single-sex elementary or secondary schools as long as they are not vocational
schools. However, when an LEA establishes a public school for one sex - unless
it is necessary to remedy discrimination - any student excluded based on sex
must have made available comparable courses, services, and facilities, pursuant
to the same policies and criteria of admissions.
OFFICE FOR CIviL. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., APPLYING FEDERAL CML RIGHTS LAWS TO
PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS (May, 2000), available at http/www.uscharterschools.org/lpt/
uscs-docs/45 (last visited Oct. 29, 2000).
11. See Cowen, supra note 3, quoting Ed Yohnka, director of communications for the
Chicago ACLU chapter: "We continue to be concerned about the school because funda-
mentally we believe that a quality educational opportunity...should be made available to every
student in the Chicago public school system and should not be limited by race, ethnicity,
religion, or gender." Yohnka mentions that the ACLU challenged Lane Tech High School
thirty years ago for excluding girls, leading to the school becoming coeducational. Id.
12. See Cowen, supra note 3.
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"comparable opportunities do exist for boys elsewhere in the Chicago
Public School system." 3
If the ACLU, NOW, or another organization challenges the Young
Women's Leadership Charter School, the analysis would start with
a determination of whether a charter school is a state actor, then
proceed to an equal protection analysis. Prior case law generally
proscribes gender discrimination in state-funded education. 4
This Note will analyze the equal protection strictures applied
to single-sex charter schools. First, this Note will define and discuss
features and characteristics of charter schools, and legislation enabling
districts to form charter schools. Second, this Note will discuss the
proponents' and detractors' arguments about single-sex education.
The third part will address the state actor status of charter schools.
Fourth, this Note will analyze significant case law regarding single-sex
public education under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, this
Note will assert that charter schools indeed are state actors, and
therefore must adhere to current statutes and case law that prohibit
gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Should a future plaintiff challenge the single-sex policy of a charter
school on Equal Protection grounds, the school's program will be
analyzed in accordance with case law discussed in part four.
Charter schools offer a unique alternative form of elementary
and secondary education to students who choose to attend them.
While single-sex charter schools are not prevalent at this time, such
a twist on the charter school alternative may appeal to some parents
and children who believe students may benefit from single-sex
schooling. Some research evidence shows that children fare better
in single-sex classrooms, or that these single-sex alternatives provide
a means of redress for past discrimination against members of a sex. 5
This research evidence may provide the basis to defeat a future
challenge by demonstrating an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the segregation based upon sex.' 6 Comparable choices for boys
and girls may be created in elementary, intermediate and secondary
settings. Therefore, single-sex charter schools may be able to survive
13. See id.
14. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1995) (holding single-gender
admissions policies in state-funded military college violated the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding
female-only admissions policy in nursing program at state university violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See, e.g., Morgan, infra note 53 and accompanying text; Haynes, supra note 7; How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE Gus (Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Educ. Found., 1992) (asserting the,
cause of girls' educational difficulties and low self-esteem was gender bias in schools).
16. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 597 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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because they benefit members of what was deemed, under some higher
education analyses, a discriminatory classification based upon gender.
CHARTER SCHOOLS
Charter Schools Defined
"A charter school is a public school of choice which is authorized
by state statute and which is established by and operates under the
terms of a charter granted to school organizers by apublic sponsoring
agency to whom the school is thereafter accountable."17 The charter,
or contract, is usually with a state agency or local school board; creates
a framework for the school's operation; and provides public support
for the school for the time specified in the charter.18 Organizers can
be parents, teachers, school administrators, or others.19 "The school's
charter gives the school autonomy over its operation and frees the
17. CATHERINE BLAKEMORE, A PUBLIC SCHOOL OF YOUR OWN: YOUR GUIDE TO CREATING
AND RUNNING A CHARTER SCHOOL 1-2 (1998) (emphasis in original).
18. OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE STATE OF
CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, NATIONAL STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS, FOURTH-YEAR REPORT 1
(2000) (hereinafter STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 20001. Proponents of charter schools have
listed several elements of a model charter school strategy, or framework, that varies slightly
between sources. One model suggests:
1. Teachers, parents, and other community members can create new schools
or convert existing schools by authority of a charter granted by an
authorized sponsor.
2. Charter schools are responsible for improved student achievement.
3. In return for accountability for specific results, the state grants an upfront
waiver of virtually all rules and regulations governing public schools.
4. The state authorizes more than one organization to start and operate a
charter school in the community.
5. The organizers, usually teachers, parents, or other community members,
can approach either a local board or some other public body to be the school
sponsor.
6. The charter school is a school of choice.
7. The charter school is a discrete legal entity.
8. The full per-pupil allocation should move with the student to the charter
school.
9. Participating teachers should be given support to try new opportunities by
having their status protected.
JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICAN
EDUCATION 2 (1996). A similar listing may be found in BRYAN C. HASSEL, THE CHARTER
SCHOOL CHALLENGE: AVOIDING THE PITFALLS, FULFILLING THE PROMISE 5 (1999) (citing TED
KOLDERiE, THE STATES BEGIN TO WITHDRAW THE EXCLUSIVE (Pub. Servs. Redesign Project,
St. Paul, Minn.: Ctr. for Policy Studies 1993)). Hassel's list states "[t]he school is public (that
is, it is nonreligious, does not charge tuition, cannot discriminate or engage in selective
admissions, and must follow health and safety laws)." Id. at 5.
19. See OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., CHARTER
SCHOOLS: A STATE LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 2 (1998) [hereinafter STATE LEGISLATIVE UPDATE].
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school from regulations that other public schools must follow." ° At
the same time, charter schools "are free, open to all, and designed
to be publicly accountable.... "21 Accountability requires meeting the
goals of the charter, which often include improving student
performance.22 "Charter schools serve as choice schools rather than
traditional neighborhood schools; typically, charter schools may enroll
any student in the district, rather than being limited to students living
in the school's immediate vicinity."' Often, charter schools serve
students who have not succeeded in conventional schools, such as
students with special needs learning styles or children who have
dropped out of school or had legal problems.24 Many charter schools
serve minority and disadvantaged children.'
Akey element of charter schools is that they are, indeed, public.'
Charter schools are financed largely with tax dollars, assuring the
schools public funding for operating as a public institution while
"subject to all applicable federal laws and to those applicable state
laws from which it has not been granted waivers."' Each state
determines its own charter school funding procedures, such as
receiving a percentage of the school district's per pupil operating
revenue or revenues from the school district based upon categorical
programs.2 Start-up funding may come from a number of sources:
businesses, charitable foundations, and the federal government, or
funds allocated by state legislatures.' Charter schools may also elect
to have local school districts provide some services. 0
20. STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, supra note 18, at 1.
21. STATE LEGISLATIVE UPDATE, supra note 19, at 2.
22. STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, supra note 18, at 1.
23. Kevin S. Huffman, Note, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and the New
School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1294 (1998).
24. HASSEL, supra note 18, at 129; see also NATHAN, supra note 18, at 133.
25. STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, supra note 18, at 30. The study states the fear that
charter schools would serve mostly white students has not materialized. Charter schools
enrolled a larger percentage of students of color than the public schools in those states with
an open charter school. Id. Charter schools were more likely to enroll African-American
students and Hispanic students than all public schools. Id. Thirty-nine percent of all charter
school students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, a common figure used to show
economic disadvantage, while thirty-seven percent of all public school students were eligible.
Id. at 34.
26. BLAKEMORE, supra note 17, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 53.
29. See id. at 92-95, 155-57; NATHAN, supra note 18, at 176-77 (describing sources of start-
up funding).
30. See generally BLAKEMORE, supra note 17 (suggesting the need to decide which services
school districts should provide, such as transportation, special education, insurance, and
custodial services); see STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, supra note 18, at 48-49 (providing
statistics on sources of charter school services). School districts provide approximately
20011
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Charter schools are distinguishable from conventional public
schools in the degree of autonomy they possess through the terms
of the charter.3 1 Most charter schools have primary control over
administrative functions such as budget and hiring; and control over
operation of their educational programs, such as scheduling and
curriculum, but only fifty-nine percent reported primary control over
student admissions policies.32
Though ultimately accountable to some public authority, charter
schools in theory are governed by independent boards with a great
deal of autonomy. Because their curriculums, teaching methods,
and management practices affect only those who choose to attend,
charter schools do not have to convince districtwide majorities
that their approaches are right."5
Charter schools have incentives to perform because their students
are attending by choice, and the public authority granting a charter
can revoke the charter for failure to meet standards.34 One aspect
of accountability is "compliance with all applicable laws."35 In some
states, legislative provisions explicitly state that violation of law is
.a ground for revocation of the charter.
3 6
Charter School Legislation
The first charter school law was enacted in Minnesota in 199 1,"
and by September 1999, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia
had passed charter legislation.' State laws vary, but most contain
twenty-five percent of all services in all charter schools. Id. at 49.
31. See STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, supra note 18, at 48-49.
32. Id. at 46-48. "Charter schools are afforded flexibility to make independent decisions
and set policy about both educational and management issues, though some school decisions
may be constrained either by provisions of the state's charter legislation or by decisions and
practices implemented by their charter granting agency." Id. at 46.
33. HASSEL, supra note 18, at 3.
34. Id. at 79.
35. BLAKEMORE, supra note 17, at 5.
36. STATE LEGISLATIVE UPDATE, supra note 19, at 3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 2000, supra note 18, at 10. More than 1,400 charter
schools were in operation as of September 1999. Id. Washington State had a charter school
initiative on the ballot in November 2000. Education is Big on Ballots, TIME, Nov. 6, 2000,
at 85. Voters defeated the referendum. Id. Linda Shaw, Charter schools apparently defeated,
but battle goes on, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, available at http'//archives.seattletimes
.nwsource.com (last visited May 3, 2001).
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rules governing establishment, accountability, funding, and exemption
from state laws. 9
"The most significant and controversial aspect of charter school
legislation is the ability of charter school applicants to request a
virtual blanket waiver from administrative regulations and local
district rules but not from health, safety, dismissal or various civil
rights regulations."'4 Some charter school statutes specifically require
that charter schools not discriminate on an illegal basis." At least
one state, Mississippi, does not expressly prohibit sex segregation
in its charter school statute, but allows segregation elsewhere in the
education statutes. 2 Other statutes exempt schools from routine
operating regulations, but require they be run in accordance with state
and federal civil rights laws.43
39. See generally STATE LEGISLATIVE UPDATE, supra note 19. The update surveys new
charter school legislation using eight categories as follows: charter-granting authority; types
(newly created, or converted public or private schools); number of schools allowed; waivers of
state laws; staff regulations, such as teacher certification; funding; and accountability with
respect to charter duration, revocation, student assessment, and charter renewal. Id. In the
four laws reviewed in this publication, all required the schools to meet applicable state and
local civil rights requirements. See also BLAKEMORE, supra note 17, at 3; Huffman, supra note
23, at 1296 (discussing in part Congressional testimony by Cornelia M. Blanchett before
Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families, Sept. 16, 1997, available at 1997 WL
14150775 (detailing differences in oversight):
In some states, charter schools are largely deregulated: They are free to decide
their own curricula and admissions policies; to hire, fire, and pay teachers by
their own standards; and to spend money as they determine. Other states have
placed limitations on charter schools, requiring observation of local collective
bargaining agreements with extensive local and state oversight.
Id. at 1296.
40. Karla A. Turekian, Comment, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: the
Legality of Charter Schools, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1997).
41. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2066(b) (2000) ("A charter school shall not discriminate
on any basis that would be illegal if used by a school system"); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27A-
2(b)(2) (West 2000) (declaring that the General Assembly finds the Article is enacted "to
increase learning opportunities...in a manner that does not discriminate on the basis
of...gender...").
42. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-9 (2001) (establishing charter schools). § 37-11.3 states:
[A]ny...board of trustees is hereby vested with the authority to provide by
assignment or reassignment, or other appropriate means, for the separation of
students according to sex, separately by classrooms or schools, when such board,
in its discretion, determines such separation will promote or preserve the public
peace, order or tranquility of the school district, or the health, morals or
education of the students.
Id.
43. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104 (3) (2000) ("A charter school shall be subject
to all federal and state laws and constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of...gender..."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3996(C) (2001) ("A charter school...shall comply
with state and federal laws and regulations otherwise applicable to public schools with
respect to civil rights...").
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The U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
says charter schools may qualify admissions through selection
procedures." Under some circumstances, Title IX permits single-sex
public education.'
An amendment to the Departments of Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,4
Fiscal Year 2001, provided for funding for same gender schools.47
According to the amendment's sponsor, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
(R-Texas) "[tihe Senate's unanimous support for the Hutchison
amendment sends an unmistakable signal to the Department of
Education that it is time to create new options in public education."'
The legislative history shows that Congress intended to provide for
single-sex educational programs that comply with the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence.49
OCR's allowance of qualified admissions into charter schools and
iteration of Title IX's exemption for single gender schools, and the
enactment of the Hutchison amendment seem to indicate some public
support for allowing or encouraging single-sex public schools, so long
as the establishment of single-sex schools adheres to applicable law.
44. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., APPLYING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS TO PUBLIC CHARTER
SCHOOLS, supra note 10.
45. See id.
46. H.R. 4577, 106th Cong. (2000).
47. Id. (engrossed Senate Amendment 3619). The amendment states "It]hat funds made
under this heading to carry out section 6301(b) of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 shall be available for education reform projects that provide same gender schools
and classrooms, consistent with applicable law." The amendment was approved by a 99-0 vote
in the Senate. Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, available at http:llthomas
.loc.gov (last visited May 3, 2001). The amended bill, H.R. 4577, was enacted as Consolidated
Appropriations Act- Fiscal Year 2001. The amendment was incorporated into the law under
Title III - Department of Education, School Improvement Programs. The amendment stated,
"Provided further that funds made available under this heading to carry out section 6301(b)
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 shall be available for education
reform projects that provide same gender schools and classrooms, consistent with applicable
law." Consolidated Appropriations Act - Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A-33.
48. Press Release, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senate Adds Senator Hutchison's Single
Sex Education Amendment (June 30, 2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/-hutchison/
pr1256.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2000).
49. The Committee report stated:
The conferees support the use of funds appropriated under section 6301(b) to
provide single-sex school or classroom programs provided that the recipient
"complies with applicable law," a phrase intended to incorporate all relevant
Supreme Court opinions, including U.S. v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), as
proposed by the Senate. The House bill contained no similar provision. The
conferees intend that this provision does not require local educational agencies
to use title VI funds only for gender equity activities.
H.R. Rep. No. 106-1033, at 182-83 (2000). Supreme Court decisions regarding single-sex
education are discussed infra notes 75-142 and accompanying text.
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SINGLE SEX EDUCATION
The effectiveness of single-sex education has emerged as a
contentious issue in recent years, particularly after publication of
various studies that describe difficulties adolescent girls face in
education." Proponents of single-sex education point to studies that
indicate girls and boys learn differently.51 "As the theory goes, boys
at this age tend to outshine girls in math and science, while girls
outperform boys in reading. Separating them, educators say, cuts
down on hormone-driven distractions with the opposite sex and allows
teachers to focus better on each group's deficiencies."52 Furthermore,
proponents argue that "[g]irls in single-sex schools have higher self-
esteem, are more interested in nontraditional subjects such as science
and math, and are less likely to stereotype jobs and careers."53
A development became apparent, however, in more recent studies
that control for variables that could influence student performance
such as socioeconomic status, prior academic achievement, and career
aspirations and educational goals held before commencing single-sex
schooling.' Earlier studies that did not take into account other
variables had a tendency to conclude that single-sex education for
girls correlated with positive achievement results.5 Later studies,
Levit asserts, "are more likely to find that the effects of institutional
gender type are insignificant and to show other variables.., matter
much more to student satisfaction."56
Detractors also argue that by separating girls, single-sex
education reinforces gender stereotypes of femininity and discourages
50. See generally SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LOOKAT SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION FOR GIRLS
(Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Educ. Found., 1998) (compiling papers addressing the single-sex
education issue and taking a less laudatory posture toward the issue than previous studies
regarding single-sex education); How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS, supra note 15 (asserting
that the cause of girls' educational difficulties and low self-esteem was gender bias in schools);
Kaminer, supra note 8 (attacking women's and girls' schools as sexist and reinforcing gender
stereotypes).
51. See Haynes, supra note 7.
52. Id.
53. Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis after United States v. Virginia:
Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381,
391 n.36 (1999) (citing MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILINGAT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS CHEAT Gnus 232-34(1994)).
54. Levit, supra note 5, at 500. Levit concludes that single-sex education is detrimental
and existing research data should not be a basis for finding a sex-segregated school
demonstrates an exceedingly persuasive justification. Id. at 522.
55. Id. at 500.
56. Id.
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academic competition with males.5 7 Those who are drawing upon
studies must also consider the larger sociological context of gender
bias and the historical inequities women have experienced in
education.5" The research into the performance of girls in mixed
educational environments versus sexually segregated environments
is not conclusive, producing mostly equivocal results.59
STATE ACTOR OR NOT?
The first step in analyzing whether a charter school is violating
constitutional mandates of the Equal Protection clause is to decide
if it is a state actor; challenges against a private actor cannot stand.60
The U.S. Supreme Court requires actions be taken under state
authority to be considered a violation of constitutional rights.
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual;
an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether
they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not
sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under state
authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably
be vindicated by resort to laws of the state for redress."1
In determining if an entity is a state actor, the Supreme Court
uses several factors to find state action. An activity "may be state
57. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 8 (criticizing all-female schools as promoting contradic-
tory goals).
58. See Levit, supra note 5, at 511-17.
59. Id. at 500-06 (citing studies by Professor Valerie Lee at the University of Michigan
challenging notions that girls' schools are not sexist, and finding no pattern of results favoring
either single-sex or coeducational schools). Levit argues that single-sex education study
results are often misconstrued and misused by those who wish to advocate for single-sex
education. Id. at 508-11. See also Diane S. Pollard, The Contexts of Single-Sex Classes, in
SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 81 (Am. Ass'n of
Univ. Women Educ. Found., 1998) (stating that conclusions cannot be drawn about the impact
of single-sex classes).
It is difficult to make a general assessment of single-sex classes because of three
issues inherent in much of the research and practice in this area. These are (1)
the disparity in the goals of single-sex classes, (2) the varieties of ways these
classes have been implemented, and (3) a need for more systematic, long-term
research in this area.
Id.
60. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,17 (1883); see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 936-37 (discussing rationale behind state action requirement).
61. Id.
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"962action when it results from the State's exercise of 'coercive power,
"when the State provides 'significant encouragement, either overt
or covert,' 63 when a private actor operates as a 'willful participant in
joint activity with the State or its agents,"'6 "controlled by an 'agency
of the State,"'' "has been delegated a public function by the State,"'
or when the private entity "is 'entwined with governmental policies'
or when government is 'entwined in [its] management or control.' 67
Another way of labeling tests is identifying them as the close nexus
test, the government/state compulsion test, or the public/government
function test.68
In determining if a charter school is a state actor, courts look to
the existence of legislative enactments, the charter and the role of
the state in regulating the school, the receipt of public funds, the use
of publicly owned property, and the degree to which education is a
traditional state-supplied function.69
An argument can be made that the degree of autonomy the state
gives charter school operators though its statute, in granting the
charter, and in allowing private entities to operate the school with
minimal interference, would lead to a finding that there is not a close
enough nexus, or governmental coercion, to lead to a finding of state
action.7° Charter schools, however, receive public funding and may
- in some instances - contract with public entities to proVide
62. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n., 531U.S. 288, 296 (2001)
(citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)) (holding state high school athletic
association was a state actor because of the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in
its operations).
63. Id. (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
64. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982)).
65. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts of Phila., 353 U.S. 230, 231
(1957)).
66. Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627-28 (1991); West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988)).
67. Id. (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301 (1966)).
68. Jason Lance Wren, Note, Charter Schools: Public or Private? An Application of the
Fourteenth Amendment's State Action Doctrine to These Innovative Schools, 19 REV. LrrG.
135, 152-54 (2000). The close nexus test was expanded in Blum, which required such a close
nexus between the State and the action that the action may be treated as that of the State,
or, stated differently, the entity performs actions that are "normally within the exclusive
control of the state...." Id. at 152-53. The government compulsion test requires that the state
exercise coercion or either overt or covert encouragement, as stated in Blum. Id. at 153. The
public/government function test asks if the function performed by the private entity is one
that is usually the "exclusive prerogative of the State." Id. at 154 (quoting Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)).
69. Id. at 160-65.
70. Id.
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services. This "creates a public quality that will weigh heavily in a
court's state action determination."7'
In the only case determining whether a privately owned and
operated school that received substantial public funding was a state
actor, the Court held a school's actions not to be under state
imprimatur.7 '2 The Court in Brentwood characterized the state's role
in Rendell-Baker as "mere public buyers of contract services, whose
payments for services rendered do not convert the service providers
into public actors."7' Receipt of public funding is but one aspect of
the analysis. Charter schools must be accountable to the state in
budgeting, adherence to state laws from which they received no
waiver, and student performance. 74 Legislation, school charters, and
charter school advocates emphasize that the schools are an autono-
mous entity within a public scheme. Like the Athletic Association
in BrentwoodAcademy, charter schools are "intertwined" with public
officials and public requirements. The schools are ultimately
accountable to the state for use of funds, adherence to standards, and
compliance with terms of their charters. This accountability likely
supports a finding that charter schools are state actors.
TREATMENT OF SINGLE SEX-EDUCATION IN THE COURTS
Discrimination based upon gender was brought under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Reed v. Reed. 7
5
The Court has required application of intermediate scrutiny to
classifications based upon sex.'6 The two leading cases on single-sex
education, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan7 and United
States v. Virginia (VMI),78 addressed single-sex education in a higher
education context.
In Hogan, the Court struck down the single-sex admissions
standard that denied Joe Hogan admission to a nursing baccalaureate
program at Mississippi University for Women, a policy which Hogan
challenged on Equal Protection grounds." The State argued that the
71. Id. at 163.
72. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Cohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)).
73. Brentwood, 531 U.S. 288, at 299 (2001).
74. See STATE LEGISLATIVE UPDATE, supra note 19.
75. 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (finding statute favoring men over women as estate executors
unconstitutional).
76. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
77. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
78, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
79. 458 U.S. at 733.
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policy was justified as compensating for discrimination.' The Court
rejected this argument, based upon facts showing that women earn
a substantial majority of baccalaureate nursing degrees in the state
and nationwide, and that they comprise a near-absolute majority of
employed registered nurses.81 The policy perpetuated the stereotypical
view of nursing as a female job. 2
The Court stated, "[A] gender-based classification favoring one
sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members
of the sex that is disproportionately burdened."' It qualified the
standard by reiterating, "[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensa-
tory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any
inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."8 4
The analysis must not be colored by stereotypes about the genders,
and a policy presuming inferiority or weaknesses of a gender will be
struck down." The test "must be applied free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.... [Ihf the
statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or
to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate."'
Not only did the State fail to demonstrate a compensatory effect
benefiting women, but it also could not show its single-sex policy was
"substantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory
objective.""7
In VMI, the Court invalidated Virginia Military Institute's male-
only admissions policy and the state's attempt to create a comparable
program for women, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership.8
Rejecting Virginia's arguments that themilitary college's "adversarial
system" of education would be detrimentally altered, and the single-
gender admissions policy furthers the purpose of providing diversity
in education, the Court was unable to find the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" required by precedents. 9
80. Id. at 727.
81. Id. at 729.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 728 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)).
84. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)) (invalidating statute in
which only widows, not widowers, could collect survivors' benefits under the Social Security
Act).
85. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
86. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opinion)).
87. Id. at 730.
88. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
89. Id. at 556. The Court stated, "Iflocusing on the differential treatment or denial of
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the
proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' The burden of justification is demanding
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While Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, acknowledged
inherent differences between men and women are to be "celebrated,"
the majority opinion emphasizes that these differences may not be
applied in a stereotypical manner to exclude members of the opposite
sex.90
Compensatory measures that recognize such differences may be
acceptable, and have been upheld in a number of cases that distin-
guish women from men in various state actions.91 The Court stated
that it was addressing "specifically and only" a type of education de-
scribed in lower courts as "unique," and was not addressing Virginia's
"prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportuni-
ties."92
The state attempted to establish a comparable program after the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the case with
remediation requiring admission of women to VMI, the creation of
a comparable program, or abandonment of state support, ifremedia-
tion was not performed.' Electing to establish a comparable program,
the state created the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
(VWIL) at Mary Baldwin College, a program with a ceremonial corps
of cadets and a "cooperative" form of learning rather than the military,
adversarial, barracks atmosphere of VMI." The Court found that
VWIL was not comparable to VMI. Mary Baldwin College had lower
average Scholastic Aptitude Test scores than VMI, fewer faculty with
doctoral degrees, fewer curricular choices, inferior athletic and
physical education facilities, a smaller endowment, and none of the
advantages of entering the renowned VMI alumni network.' Such
a program was not equal, and "[w]omen seeking and fit for a VMI-
and it rests entirely on the State." Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
90. The opinion stated:
"Inherent differences" between men and women, we have come to appreciate,
remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity.... The justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or inventedpost hoc in response to litigation.
And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.
Id. at 533.
91. "Sex classifications may be used to compensate women for 'particular economic
disabilities they have suffered' 'to promote equal employment opportunity', [or] 'to advance
full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.' Id. (citations omitted).
92. 518 U.S. at 534 n.7.
93. Id. at 525-26.
94. Id. at 526-27.
95. Id. at 551.
96. Id. at 551-53.
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quality education cannot be offered anything less, under the Common-
wealth's obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection."
97
The Court did not explicitly rule out the concept of "separate but
equal"' schools segregated by gender. Indeed, by addressing the VMI
policy as a "unique" educational opportunity, the Court seems to have
left the door open to state-funded single-sex education that features
comparable programs.
Two earlier lower court cases allowed single-sex education,
although both were decided a considerable time before Hogan and
VMI.9 In Williams v. McNair, a group of male plaintiffs challenged
the women-only admissions policy at Winthrop College on Equal
Protection grounds, and lost.100 The district court relied upon the Code
of South Carolina, which created Winthrop as a women's college.'°"
Addressing the Equal Protection Clause, the court stated "a legislative
classification based on sex, has often been held to be constitutionally
permissible."' The plaintiffs were free to choose from numerous state
colleges, showed no evidence of special courses or programs at
Winthrop that would make Winthrop more appealing or beneficial
than other colleges, and, in the case of a few of the group, showed that
only geographic convenience could be gained by attending Winthrop. '
In holding Winthrop's policy did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the court wrote, "[wihile history and tradition alone may not
support discrimination, the Constitution does not require that a
classification 'keep abreast of the latest' in educational opinion,
especially when there remains a respectable opinion to the contrary;
it only demands that the discrimination not be wholly wanting in
reason."'14
The outcome in Williams would be different today, after Supreme
Court decisions in the past thirty years, such as Hogan and VMI. The
court in Williams held that it would not declare "a legislative
classification, premised as it is on respectable pedagogical opinion,
is without any rational justification and violative of the Equal
Protection Clause."0 5 Such a rational review is much less rigorous
97. Id. at 557.
98. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896)).
99. Vorchmeier v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976); Williams v. McNair,
316 F. Supp. 134 (S.C. 1970).
100. Williams, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138 (S.C. 1970).
101. Id. at 136 (citing S.C. Code § 401 (1962)).
102. Id. at 137(citations omitted).
103. Id. at 138.
104. Id. at 137 (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948)).
105. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.C. 1970).
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than the intermediate level of scrutiny applied in Craig v. Boren"°
and subsequent gender discrimination cases decided by the Supreme
Court." 7
In the other pre-Hogan lower court decision allowing single-sex
education, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held single-sex admissions regulations at Philadelphia Central and
Girls High Schools did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.'
A girl applied to the prestigious, all-male Central High School in
Philadelphia, but was refused admission, as another prestigious all-
female school, Girls' High, existed.' 9 She filed a class action suit
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from alleged unconstitutional
discrimination, and the district court granted an injunction, ordering
that female students be admitted to Central High School." 0
The Third Circuit looked to Congressional legislation to attempt
to resolve the issue of whether "the deprivation asserted is that of
the opportunity to attend a specific school, not that of an opportunity
to obtain an education at a school with comparable academic facilities,
faculty and prestige" was discriminatory."' It looked at Title IX,"2
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,"' and the
legislative history of both."" The court concluded the legislation was
"so equivocal that it cannot control the issue in this case."" It found
in legislative history "no indication of Congressional intent to order
that every school in the land be coeducational and that educators be
denied alternatives. That drastic step should require clear and
unequivocal expression.""6
106. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
107. Justice Scalia described the standard used in evaluating statutory classification based
on gender as one "that lies between the extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny."
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Clark v.
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). See also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-
27 (1982) (describing framework for analyzing policy that discriminates based on gender,
though not calling it "intermediate scrutiny").
108. Vorchmeier v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d. Cir. 1976), affd mem., 430
U.S. 703 (1977).
109. Id. at 881; see also id. at 887 ("[F] actual findings establish that, for many years past
and at the present, excellent educational facilities have been and are available to both
sexes."). Additionally, attendance at the two single-sex schools was voluntary. Id. at 886
("Moreover, enrollment at the single-sex schools is applicable only to high schools and is
voluntary, not mandatory.").
110. Id. at 881.
111. Id. at 882-83.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
113. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
114. Vorchmeier, 532 F. 2d at 883.
115. Id. at 885.
116. Id. The court concluded that the "ambiguous wording" of the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act demonstrated that Congress "deliberately chose not to act and to leave open
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Unable to find a definitive answer in statutory authority, the court
turned to case law dealing with sex discrimination, and found strong
applicability of Williams v. McNair which at the time was the sole
U.S. Supreme Court decision on gender classification in school
admissions." 7 Though Reed v. Reed"' mandated the "substantial
relationship" test shortly after Williams was decided," 9 the appellate
court in Vorchmeier held that Williams, despite using a "rational
relationship" test, was applicable because the facts were similar to
the case at bar, albeit with a different gender of plaintiff.2
Additionally, the "schools' restrictive admissions policy applied to both
sexes, a significant difference from the preferential statutory
procedure in Reed.""
The court recognized that "there are differences between the sexes
which may, in limited circumstances,justify disparity in law." 22 The
court found no compensatory justification for the admissions policies,
there being"no evidence of past deprivation of educational opportuni-
ties for women in the Philadelphia School District."'23
The evidence in the record, however, led the court to hold "that
a legitimate educational policy may be served by utilizing single-sex
high schools."24 The court did not decide whether to apply a rational
or substantial relationship test, as it stressed the outcome would be
the same under either.' In dicta, the majority asserted the cost of
the question of single-sex schools." Id.
117. Id. at 887.
118. 404 U.S.. 71 (1971).
119. See id. (using a "substantial relationship" test in holding unconstitutional a statute
disallowing female estate administrators if a male qualified for the appointment).
120. Vorchmeier, 532 F.2d at 887.
121. Id. The court addressed the similar effects of the admissions policy on both sexes,
stating, "Itihe plaintiff has difficulty in establishing discrimination in the school board's
policy. If there are benefits or detriments inherent in the system, they fall on both sexes in
equal measure." Id. at 886.
122. Id. The court stated that disparity is sometimes more "favorably considered when it
confers on the female some benefit tending to rectify the effects of past discrimination." Id. -
at 887.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 887-88. The court further explained:
The primary aim of any school system must be to furnish an education of as high
a quality as feasible. Measures which would allow innovation in methods and
techniques to achieve that goal have a high degree of relevance. Thus, given the
objective of a quality education and a controverted, but respected theory that
adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of the
school board here does bear a substantial relationship.
Id. at 888.
125. Id.
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abolishing single-sex schools would be too great, stifling the school
board from providing alternatives.'
After Hogan was decided, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County found sex segregation could not be justified and
exclusion of girls from Central High violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 127
The only case decided since Hogan involving the challenge of a
single-sex admissions policy in an elementary or secondary school
is Garrett v. Board of Education of Detroit."' The facts in Garrett
are similar to challenges brought against a single-sex charter school,
such as the Chicago Young Women's Leadership Academy.' The
Detroit school system planned to open three male academies, enrolling
boys from preschool through fifth grade, and not offering any
comparable academy for girls at that time. 30 The male academies
were aimed at at-risk boys in urban environments, and included
special course offerings such as an Afro-centric curriculum, mentoring,
Saturday classes, 3' and a "Rites of Passage" class emphasizing goal-
setting, responsibility, and mastery of emotions as important values
for men.3 2 The plaintiffs were female children and their parents, and
sought a preliminary injunction preventing the school board from
opening the academies."
Though the defendant argued that "coeducational programs aimed
at improving male performance have failed[,]"' the court found that
the evidence did not show that exclusion of females from the
academies would combat the failures and obstacles urban males
encounter, nor that the inclusion of females in schools is the reason
126. Id.
If she were to prevail, then all public single-sex schools would have to be
abolished. The absence of these schools would stifle the ability of the local
school board to continue with a respected educational methodology. It follows
too that those students and parents who prefer an education in a public, single-
sex school would be denied their freedom of choice. The existence of private
school is no more an answer to those people than it is to the plaintiff.
Id.
127. Levit, supra note 5, at 458 (discussing Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 478 A.2d 1352
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).
128. 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
129. See id. at 1006.
130. Id. at 1006-07. "The Board hints that an academy for girls is in the works." Id. at
1013.
131. Id. at 1006.
132. Id. at 1007.
133. Id. at 1005.
134. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007.
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schools are failing urban males.'35 The statistics presented by the
school board, such as high homicide, unemployment, and educational
drop-out rates among African-American males, did not demonstrate
"that excluding girls is substantially related to the achievement of
the Board's objectives."' Thus, the program would not satisfy the
requirement of Hogan that the gender classification serve '"important
governmental objectives and that discriminatory means employed'
are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. '"" 7
The court, as the appellate court had done in Vorchmeier, looked
to statutory authority to control the decision, but unlike Vorchmeier,
found that Title IXwould not allow such a single-sex program. ' The
court looked at the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA)39
as well, finding that the only decision considering gender segregation
under the EEOA was easily distinguishable and could not support
the plaintiffs' claim." The court did not consider whether the
program could qualify as an affirmative action program, for the school
board admitted that the academies were not such a program.''
Though the court acknowledged the purpose of the academies was
important and that urban males were at risk, it held this purpose
was insufficient to overcome the statutory and constitutional authority
prohibiting establishment of sex-segregated educational opportunities,
and granted the injunction."'
135. Id. at 1008. The court pointed out "the educational system is also failing females."
Id.
136. Id. at 1007.
137. Id. at 1006 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
138. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1008-09. The court held that Title IX's exclusion of public
elementary and secondary schools applied to "historically pre-existing single sex schools." Id.
at 1009. The school board argued that the academies remedied the "limited participation of
urban males in educational programs and activities," as allowed by 24 C.F.R. § 106.3(b) ("In
the absence of finding of discrimination [by the Assistant Secretary of Education] on the basis
of sex...recipient may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which
resulted in limited participation therein by persons of a particular sex."). Id. at 1009. The
court, however, deferred to the opinion of OCR that"all male public elementary and secondary
school programs violate Title IX." Id.
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1701-1722 (1990).
140. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1010. The case, United States v. Hinds County School Board,
concerned a school district that consisted of only four sex-segregated schools to which students
were assigned permanently. Id. (citing United States v. Hinds Co. Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619 (5th
Cir. 1977)). The Detroit School Board considered its academies experimental, on a three-year
plan, and voluntary for students to attend rather than mandated by assignment. Id. The
court also considered Michigan statutes and concluded that the plaintiffs would be likely to
succeed with their claim under Michigan educational legislation. Id.
141. Id. at 1011.
142. Id. at 1014.
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CONCLUSION
Single-sex charter schools are an innovative way to address
concerns educators and the public have about the performance of
students in elementary and secondary grades. The gender based
admissions policies may be challenged, however, as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause. Though much of the case law regarding
single-sex education would seem to foreclose the operation of this type
of school, such a decision is not automatic.
Under a challenge, a school may attempt to defend itself as not
being a state actor. Though the schools have a great deal of autonomy,
and case law such as Rendell-Baker has shown that state funding
alone does not impute the status of state actor to an entity, the charter
school will be found a state actor. Closely resembling this is
Brentwood Academy, " in which athletic organizations that did not
allocate state funding but did supervise public schools were found
to be "intertwined" enough to be state actors.
An Equal Protection challenge will assert that the school's stated
purpose of having a single-sex environment incorporates overbroad
generalizations and stereotypes about the sexes in its establishment.
This is the danger that, for example, all-girls' schools may face in
producing evidence of girls' inferior performance in co-educational
classrooms or in mathematics and science classes. Detractors will
present their own evidence showing that studies documenting inferior
performance of children in coeducational classes are inconclusive,
and that gender stereotypes may be reinforced by such segregated
environments.
To withstand such a challenge, a school's best course of action
lies in proving several points. First, a school may attempt to show
a compensatory purpose that affords a gender an opportunity that
past discrimination has denied them. This relies on studies and
statistical evidence that children in co-educational classrooms have
been denied an opportunity to reach their potential, such as research
that girls fare worse in science classes in which they compete with
boys. Giving girls their own class, the argument goes, compensates
for the discrimination they have experienced in co-ed classes.
The existing U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding single-sex
education focus on equality in a higher education environment.
Indeed, the majority in VMI emphasized that the decision concerned
a "unique" educational opportunity. Distinguishing these higher-
education decisions of the Supreme Court from the facts of an
143. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
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elementary or secondary school case may be a necessary tactic to
defending the vitality of a single-sex charter school.
Current legislative and regulatory action, or - in the case of the
ACLU's complaint to OCR about the Young Women's Leadership
School of Harlem - inaction, may call for judicial deference to
changing notions about the acceptability of alternative forms of
schooling. The inclusion of a provision allowing funding for single-sex
schools and classrooms in the Fiscal Year 2001 Appropriations Act
indicates Congressional intent to allow experimentation with single-
sex schools. OCR had yet to issue an opinion regarding the Harlem
girls' school as of 2001, a lack of action that would seem to condone
such a program.
Perhaps the safest way to ensure that a girls' charter school
survives judicial scrutiny is to create a comparable all-boys charter
school or demonstrate that an all-boys public school of similar quality
is available to males desiring such an education. A critical aspect
of the VMI decision was the dissimilarity of the female-only program,
VWIL, which the Commonwealth attempted to establish to equate
to the male-only program at VMI. The existence of all-female Girls'
High in Philadelphia was a factor in Vorchmeier, in which the Central
High's male-only admissions policy and Girls' Highs female-only policy
affected the sexes equally.
No decided case since Scalia's dire VMI prediction has challenged
the notion of single-sex education in primary and secondary schools.
Though opponents of such schools have voiced their dissatisfaction,
arguing that single gender schools foster unequal treatment of the
sexes, the schools are still open. In the event that schools are
challenged, if proponents can present sufficient, current evidence of
positive effects of single-sex education on performance, and establish
or show evidence of comparable programs for the opposite sex, they
will possibly slip through the crack in the crystal ball and survive.
SARAH KINSMAN
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